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Abstract: David Chalmers’ two-dimensionalism is an ambitious philosophical program that aims 
to “ground” or “construct” Fregean meanings and restore “the golden triangle” of apriority, 
necessity, and meaning that Kripke seemingly broke. This paper aims to examine critically what 
Chalmers’ theory can in reality achieve. It is argued that the theory faces severe challenges. There 
are some gaps in the overall arguments, and the reasoning is in some places somewhat circular. 
Chalmers’ theory is effectively founded on certain strong philosophical assumptions. It is 
concluded that it is unclear whether the theory can deliver all it promises. 
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1  Introduction 
It is common to divide theories of meanings and propositions roughly into two broad groups: on 
the one hand, the Fregean theories, and on the other hand, the Millian or the Russellian theories.1 
Logical positivists such as Carnap maintained that the totalities of necessary truths, a priori 
knowable truths, and analytic truths coincide. Both this latter view and the Fregean theories of 
meaning are now much less in vogue, especially as a consequence of the groundbreaking work of 
Kripke. David Chalmers is, however, swimming against this tide of opinion. In a series of 
writings, he has put forward his specific version of epistemic two-dimensional (2D) semantics 
(see Chalmers 2002, 2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2011a, 2011b). Chalmers’ broadly Fregean approach 
has received quite a lot of attention in the recent philosophy of language. This semantic theory 
also plays an essential role in Chalmers’ famous argument against materialism (see esp. Chalmers 
2009/2010), which makes it all the more important. 
Chalmers’ theory is a variation of the familiar possible worlds semantics. It utilizes the 
generic so-called two-dimensional framework. Previous approaches within this general family 
 
1 The direct reference theory of the meaning of names is regularly called “Millian.” The related view of 




have been presented by Kaplan (1977), Stalnaker (1978), Evans (1979), and Davies and 
Humberstone (1981). However, these have typically been local theories with rather limited scope 
and philosophical goals, dealing only with indexicals, descriptive names, and/or rigidified 
“actually”-involving expressions, for example. Chalmers’ framework, in contrast, aims to be an 
all-encompassing semantic theory that applies to expressions of all sorts, and in which the 
semantic values at issue are deeply connected to apriority.2 It involves an entire philosophically 
ambitious research program. In particular, Chalmers explicitly states that his purpose is not merely 
to put forward a tool for analyzing independently grounded Fregean meanings, for that would not 
help if someone is doubtful about Fregean meanings. Therefore, he cannot presuppose Fregean 
meanings. Chalmers says repeatedly that his goal is instead to “construct,” “erect,” or “ground” 
Fregean meanings – or at least a central aspect of meaning – in terms of modal notions, and 
apparently in this way convince even a skeptic of Fregean meanings (see Chalmers 2006b, pp. 
69–70).3 The ambition is ultimately to regain the glory of the traditional “golden triangle” of 
reason, meaning, and modality – or perhaps, of apriority, analyticity, and necessity (see below) – 
which especially Kripke has brought into bad standing (see Chalmers 2004, 2006b). 
In this paper, I shall raise some critical questions on how well all the pieces really fit together 
and to what extent Chalmers’ 2D apparatus really can succeed in supporting the philosophical 
views it is supposed to reinforce. There is already quite a lot of critical discussion of both two-
dimensionalism more generally and Chalmers’ approach in particular in the literature. However, 
a large share of it focuses on two-dimensionalism interpreted as a variant of the description theory 
of reference, or descriptivism for short. Chalmers, however, has repeatedly insisted that at least 
his own two-dimensionalist approach is not committed to descriptivism. Accordingly, in what 
follows, I aim to evaluate his account mostly independently of the question of descriptivism. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the main features of Chalmers’ system are 
reviewed, while in Section 3, certain concerns of a more technical nature are discussed. More 
general philosophical worries are presented in Section 4, and in Section 5, some conclusions are 
briefly summed up. 
 
2  A Closer Look at Chalmers’ 2D Framework 
2.1  Possible Worlds in Chalmers’ Framework 
What is common to different two-dimensional theories is that expressions and sentences are 
evaluated in relation to two different classes of “possible worlds” (or at least in two different 
ways). The best-known example is probably Kaplan’s analysis of demonstratives and indexicals: 
the semantic value of an utterance involving them depends on both the context in which the 
utterance is made (who utters it, where, and when) and how things are in the world; two distinct 
semantic values – the “character” and “content” – of the utterance are also distinguished (Kaplan 
1977). Chalmers calls such versions of the 2D approach where the contexts of utterance play a 
key role “contextual.” 
Chalmers’ own interpretation of the 2D framework is, however, quite different, namely 
epistemic. In his approach, the relevant “possible worlds” of the 1st dimension, or “scenarios” (as 
he prefers to call them), are intended to be all “worlds” that are not ruled out a priori; they are 
worlds which are possible relative to truths that are (ideally) a priori knowable. For example, the 
 
2 Chalmers sometimes calls such overarching approaches “two-dimensionalism” in order to distinguish 
them from the earlier, more local and modest applications of general two-dimensional ideas. He mentions 
Lewis, Jackson, and Braddon-Mitchell as other advocates of two-dimensionalism.  
3 Chalmers also writes elsewhere: “We could simply assume a Fregean view of propositions according to 
which these propositions [that Hesperus is not Phosphorus, and that Hesperus is not Hesperus] are distinct, 
but the viability of such a view is contested. Furthermore, one aim of the present treatment is to use 
epistemic space to help make sense of a Fregean conception of propositions. If so, one cannot simply 
presuppose such a conception.” (Chalmers 2011a, p. 63) 
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sentence “Hesperus is not Phosphorus” is “epistemically possible” for Chalmers (although it is 
not metaphysically possible according to the standard Kripkean view): the sentence is certainly 
false, but we cannot know this purely a priori. Chalmers calls such a sentence, or the state of 
affairs it expresses, “conceivable.”  
Chalmers’ second dimension relates to the familiar metaphysically possible worlds (in the 
normal Kripkean sense). However, after putting forward this general 2D framework, Chalmers 
says fairly little about the 2nd dimension. It is assumed to be well understood. His interest is almost 
exclusively in the intensions defined for the 1st dimension (see below). Accordingly, I shall myself 
focus in what follows primarily on the epistemic 1st dimension of the framework: worlds that are 
possible in relation to a priori knowledge. 
Chalmers never explicitly notes this, but with regard to the 1st dimension, his system is 
basically a variation of Hintikka’s familiar “epistemic logic” – albeit focusing only on  
a priori knowability. A priori knowledge specifically was analyzed with the tools of modal logic 
already by Anderson (1993). Perhaps even more accurately, Chalmers’ treatment of 
conceivability comes very close to the Hintikka-style treatment of propositional attitudes with 
possible world semantics, especially the logic of imagination developed principally by Niiniluoto 
(1986). So generally speaking, there is nothing particularly peculiar in Chalmers’ idea of 
analyzing a priori knowability and conceivability in terms familiar from modal logic. 
It is well-known in the literature that there are a couple of quite different ways of 
understanding “possible worlds.” On the one hand, Hintikka and Kripke, for example, reflect on 
“small worlds”; their “possible worlds” are often quite limited and local scenarios, for instance, 
about how a person could have chosen to proceed differently in a given situation. On the other 
hand, for Lewis, for example, possible worlds are “big worlds,” entire all-inclusive alternative 
universes. Chalmers’ general view of worlds is closer to Lewis here. 
 
2.2  From senses to intensions 
Fregean intuitions are attractive, but unfortunately Frege’s notion of sense (“Sinn”) was left quite 
unclear. Chalmers joins the tradition of Carnap (1947), Montague (1968, 1970), and Lewis 
(1970), in which the Fregean notions of sense and reference are explicated by intensions and 
extensions defined in the formal framework of possible world semantics. The extension of a 
singular term (e.g., proper name, definite description) is an individual entity, the extension of a 
predicate is a set of entities, and the extension of a sentence is a truth-value ((⊤ (true) or ⊥ (false)). 
Intension, in turn, is a function from possible worlds to extensions (entities, sets of entities, or 
truth-values). For example, the intension associated with a given definite description tells us, for 
each given world, which entity the description refers to in that world. The intension of a sentence 
is a function from worlds to truth-values: it tells, so to speak, in which worlds the sentence is true 
and in which it is false. Sentence intensions are often identified with propositions. The purpose 
of intensions is to reflect the aspects of meaning which go beyond extensional properties. 
In two-dimensional frameworks like that of Chalmers, there are two classes of intensions 
corresponding to two distinct classes of worlds (or, at least, two different ways of viewing 
worlds). Chalmers calls the intensions of the 1st dimension “primary intensions” (or  
“1-intensions” for short), and the intensions of the 2nd dimension “secondary intensions” (or “2-
intensions”). Further, their compound and “diagonal” intensions can be defined. However, 
Chalmers’ main focus is on primary intensions. 
In Chalmers’ system, it is primary intensions in particular that are intended to be deeply 
connected to apriority, play (roughly) the role of the Fregean senses (“Sinn”), and provide an 
account of the cognitive significance of, e.g., identity statements involving co-extensional but 
non-synonymous expressions, such as “Hesperus is Phosphorus.” “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” 
can evidently refer to different entities in some (a priori) epistemically possible worlds, so they 
also have different primary intensions. Accordingly, the sentence “Hesperus is Phosphorus” can 
be – unlike the sentence “Hesperus is Hesperus” – cognitively significant, that is, it can add to 
what is already known. 
4 
 
2.3  Chalmers’ 1-worlds: Scenarios 
As to the first dimension, Chalmers suggests that there is an overarching space of scenarios. Every 
scenario in that space should correspond to a maximally specific and all-encompassing hypothesis 
about the way the world might turn out to be, for all we know a priori. Every declarative sentence 
which is not refutable a priori should be true in some such scenario. I shall call this general picture 
Chalmers’ “basic intuitive understanding” of scenarios. 
Chalmers also considers two more specific possible ways of constructing or explicating these 
scenarios and their space: First, especially in his earlier works, Chalmers often begins with the 
standard metaphysically possible worlds, even though he adds that we should distinguish worlds 
with different “centers”: an ordered pair of an individual and a time (which may vary for otherwise 
one and the same world). Such “centered worlds”4 are intended to reflect the nature of a world 
from the perspective of a particular language-user using an expression within a world. Chalmers 
has contended that the totality of such worlds would be sufficient to serve as the epistemic space 
of scenarios. This is not obvious, as there are prima facie many statements which are not ruled 
out a priori, but are metaphysically impossible.5 Chalmers has nevertheless suggested that there 
is always a metaphysically possible world which, when viewed differently, can make such an 
impossible statement true.6 That is, Chalmers has proposed, roughly, the following thesis: 
Metaphysical Plenitude: For all S, if S is not ruled out a priori, there is a centered metaphysically 
possible world which makes S true. 
It is important to recognize that if scenarios are understood metaphysically in terms of centered 
worlds, Chalmers’ whole 2D system can only work if Metaphysical Plenitude can be established. 
Otherwise, it is doomed to break down. 
In a later paper, Chalmers grants that the match between centered metaphysical worlds and 
scenarios (in the intended basic intuitive sense) may not be perfect, and that because this approach 
“makes a substantive claim about the relationship between [metaphysically] possible worlds and 
epistemic possibility,” this “analysis goes beyond a surface analysis of epistemic possibility 
itself” (Chalmers 2011a, p. 74). Indeed, the metaphysical construction of scenarios requires taking 
already at the beginning a particular stance on certain difficult and controversial metaphysical 
questions, for example, whether there are necessarily existing beings or not.  
Second, Chalmers considers, as an alternative, understanding scenarios in purely epistemic 
terms from the start. More specifically, he seems to increasingly prefer to construct his 1-worlds, 
that is, scenarios, out of linguistic materials, namely sentences.7 The role of “worlds” is then 
played by maximal, “epistemically complete” linguistic hypotheses on how the world is. These 
are obviously extremely comprehensive and in fact infinite sentences. More exactly, a scenario, 
in this approach by Chalmers, is an equivalence class (modulo a priori entailment) of such 
maximal sentences. (See Chalmers 2006b, 2011a.) 
Chalmers says that because the epistemic construction of scenarios is grounded more purely 
in the epistemic realm, and its central theses require fewer commitments than the metaphysical 
approach, one can argue that this approach to scenarios is “more basic” (Chalmers 2006b, p. 85). 
He also grants that in the metaphysical construction, the characterization of canonical descriptions 
 
4 The general idea of centered worlds goes back to Quine 1969. Chalmers’ specific understanding of them 
is, however, roughly that of Lewis 1979.  
5 The opposites of Kripkean a posteriori necessities, for example (if one admits their existence).  
6 More exactly, Chalmers makes a distinction between a world’s verifying a sentence and satisfying a 
sentence. There may exist, according to his view, a world which verifies such a statement, even if the claim 
is not satisfied by any world. Actually, I believe that this distinction is, at the general level, much less clear 
than is often assumed. However, I must leave the more thorough discussion of this issue for another 
occasion.  
7 Under the more general label of “epistemic approach” to scenarios, Chalmers also mentions in passing the 
possibility of taking the notion of scenario as a primitive. However, he does not elaborate that alternative 
but quickly moves on to discuss the linguistic construction of scenarios (see Chalmers 2006b, p. 83). 
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of scenarios is significantly more complicated, and this “may be another point in favor of the 
purely epistemic understanding of scenarios” (Chalmers 2006b, p. 89). 
Indeed, the metaphysical approach brings with it several highly complex metaphysical 
questions peculiar to it, which are beyond the scope of this paper. In its case, things get quite 
convoluted. It is not essential for the general epistemic 2D framework as such, and Chalmers 
himself now seems often to prefer the more thoroughly epistemic approach and the linguistic 
construction. Therefore, I shall set the metaphysical construction largely aside and focus mainly 
on the basic intuitive understanding of scenarios (and to some extent, to the linguistic construction 
of scenarios). Any more specific construction can serve the purposes of Chalmers’ epistemic two-
dimensionalism only inasmuch as it conforms to the basic intuitive understanding of the space of 
scenarios. 
 
2.4  Philosophical Theses 
Chalmers contends that his epistemic 2D framework can be used to defend certain substantive 
philosophical theses. Chalmers motivates his theory with a reference to what he calls “the golden 
triangle” of connections between meaning, reason, and modality, or, perhaps simply (see below), 
of analyticity, apriority, and necessity. Kripke seemingly broke this golden triangle. Chalmers 
also mentions various more specific philosophical theses, “the Kantian Thesis,” “the Fregean 
Thesis,” “the Carnapian Thesis,” and “the Neo-Fregean Thesis,” which according to him together 
constitute and support the golden triangle. Chalmers declares that the epistemic 2D theory 
promises to “fully restore” the golden triangle (see Chalmers 2004, 2006b). 
For the general statement of those theses, Chalmers introduces the following schematic 
notation: “A ≡ B” expresses the claim that “A” and “B” have the same extension. Thus, where “A” 
and “B” are singular terms, it amounts to the identity “A = B”; where “A” and “B” are sentences, 
it will correspond to the material equivalence “A ↔ B”; and where “A” and “B” are general terms, 
it means “For all x, A(x) ↔ B(x).” The relevant theses now are the following:8 
Kantian Thesis:  A sentence S is necessary iff S is a priori. 
Carnapian Thesis: “A” and “B” have the same intension iff “A ≡ B” is necessary. 
These two entail: 
Neo-Fregean Thesis: “A” and “B” have the same intension iff “A ≡ B” is a priori. 
Now one common definition of a sentence’s being analytically true reads: “can be converted to 
logical truth by substituting synonyms for synonyms.” Synonymity is sameness of meaning, and 
intension is an explication of meaning. Consequently, “can be converted to logical truth by 
substituting an expression with the same intension to another” would presumably be a plausible 
explication of analyticity. Therefore, it seems that Chalmers could just as well have summarized 
the golden triangle simply by saying that (at least for all sentences of the form “A ≡ B”):  
(GT*)   Necessity, apriority and analyticity coincide, 
which was the neo-classical view of Carnap and other logical positivists anyway.9  
 
8 “The Fregean Thesis” that “two expressions ‘A’ and ‘B’ have the same sense iff ‘A ≡ B’ is cognitively 
insignificant” plays no further role in Chalmers’ system but is explicated with the Neo-Fregean Thesis. 
9 There is virtually no mention of the notion of analyticity in Chalmers’ key papers on 2D semantics. He 
nevertheless discusses it briefly near the end of Chalmers 2012. He even says, “I am not committed to 
analytic truths” (ibid., p. 194). Chalmers seemingly never considers the sort of explication of analyticity in 
terms of the intensions that I have sketched here, although it appears very natural in this context. He rather 
characterizes analytic truths quite roughly as “truth that subjects have a conceptual warrant to believe” 
(ibid, p. 386). Chalmers at least leaves the door open for synthetic a priori truths (ibid.; he mentions some 
sporadic mathematical, moral, and metaphysical truths as possible cases). However, Chalmers’ golden 
triangle and his Carnapian and Neo-Fregean theses arguably entail (GT*) (at least for all sentences of the 
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In any case, Chalmers gives an important place for the following thesis:10 
Core Thesis: For any sentence S, S is a priori iff S has a necessary 1-intension.11 
It is, according to Chalmers, “the distinctive claim of two-dimensionalism” and “the crucial 
requirement.” He says that it “asserts a very strong and general connection between primary 
intensions and apriority” (Chalmers 2005, p. 587; 2010, p. 548). Chalmers states that “the key 
question” is this: is it possible to define intensions and associate sentences with intension so that 
the Core Thesis is true? If so, Chalmers continues, the 2D framework “promises an account of a 
broadly Fregean aspect of meaning”; the Core Thesis does “the crucial work”; and “If the Core 
Thesis is true, it restores a golden triangle of connections between meaning, reason, and 
possibility. It also immediately entails a version of the Neo-Fregean Thesis.” (Chalmers 2006b, 
p. 64; my emphasis) By “a version,” Chalmers means the following: 
Neo-Fregean Thesis (2D Version): Two expressions “A” and “B” have the same 1-intension iff 
“A ≡ B” is a priori. 
Note also the close connection between the Core Thesis and the Kantian Thesis: the former is 
basically simply a more specific 2D version of the latter.  
In sum, Chalmers clearly thinks that the Core Thesis is a substantive and robust thesis, and 
that establishing it would be an important philosophical achievement. In particular, he maintains, 
it would restore the golden triangle. 
I shall now move on to discuss several worries I have with Chalmers’ 2D theory. I will begin 
with a few concerns of a somewhat more technical sort, and after them, discuss certain more 
general philosophical qualms.  
 
3  Technical Concerns 
3.1  From simple intensions to structured intensions?  
A large portion of Chalmers’ discussion focuses on whole sentences and their meanings: sentence 
intensions or propositions. Those are, in the standard possible world accounts, functions from 
possible worlds to truth-values. For many purposes, one can just as well take the proposition 
expressed to be more simply the set of all worlds in which the sentence is true. Either way, there 
is a well-known problem:12 all necessarily true sentences have the same intension, namely, the 
constant function which returns the truth-value ⊤ (true) for every possible world (or, if we 
consider propositions as sets of worlds: the set of all worlds). Similarly, in Chalmers’ first 
dimension, there is only one proposition (or one sentence intension) which corresponds to every 
a priori knowable truth: the constant function that attaches the value ⊤ (true) to all scenarios, or 
alternatively, the set of all scenarios. All true sentences which are (allegedly) a priori knowable, 
 
form “A ≡ B”) when analyticity is explicated in terms of intensions in the way I have suggested. If there 
are, as a matter of fact, synthetic a priori truths in this sense, so much the worse for those philosophical 
theses of Chalmers.  
10 In Chalmers 2002, it is called simply “(2*),” and in Chalmers 2006a, 2010 (Appendix), and 2011b, 
“(T5).” The label “the Core Thesis” is used in Chalmers 2004 and 2006b. The formulations also vary a bit: 
the latter talk about a sentence having “a necessary 1-intension”; the former say that a sentence’s “intension 
is true at all scenarios”; cf. footnote 11.  
11 This is a bit of an odd way of expressing things. The standard metaphysical notion of necessity belongs 
essentially to the 2nd dimension, not to the 1st dimension. However, it is clear from other passages that “has 
a necessary 1-intension” here means that the 1-intension returns the truth-value ⊤ (true) for every world 
(scenario) of the 1st dimension; that is, that S is true in every scenario; cf. footnote 10.  
12 Already Carnap seems to have been aware of this problem. Lewis 1970 and Cresswell 1985 can be viewed 
as attempts to circumvent this problem. 
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from “5 + 7 = 12” and “√2 is irrational” to “no vixen is male” and “all bachelors are unmarried,” 
would consequently have the same “meaning.” But certainly, that is utterly implausible.13 
Chalmers is perfectly aware of this difficulty. As a remedy, he suggests repeatedly that we 
should invoke, instead, more fine-grained structured intensions or structured propositions.14 He 
explains that a structured 1-intension of a sentence is a structured entity involving the 1-intensions 
of the constituent simple expressions, structured according to the sentence’s logical form. But 
beyond that, Chalmers says very little about how more exactly this is meant to be realized. 
Nevertheless, they are presumably ordered n-tuples of word intensions, or finite mathematical 
trees (corresponding to the syntactic tree of the sentence) with word intensions as their nodes, 
along the lines that Lewis (1970) and Cresswell (1985) have already earlier proposed.15 Although 
Chalmers often pleads for a pluralism about meanings, he even says that “[m]y own view is that 
if one were forced to identify propositions with one sort of entity that can be modeled in the 
framework, there would be a good case for choosing structured two-dimensional entities of some 
sort” (Chalmers 2006a, p. 595; my emphasis).16 
However, it has not been sufficiently recognized that such an approach in fact raises  
a problem: Although one can undoubtedly construct such set-theoretic structures that consist of 
word intensions and mirror the syntactic structures of sentences, they just are not sentence 
intensions – which are functions from possible worlds to truth-values. They are merely complexes 
of word intensions, which in turn have individuals and sets of individuals in their range; truth-
values, essential for sentence intensions, are simply absent. Nevertheless, Chalmers also talks 
about such structured intensions as being true or false in a world (see, e.g., Chalmers 2010, p. 
372). It is most unclear how all that is really supposed to work. 
It is obviously possible to define the intension of a sentence, given the intensions of the 
constituting words, in terms of the latter – when one knows what one is looking for. But it is the 
definition, some kind of linguistic description of the function that has some structure, not the 
function defined – which is (according to the standard modern understanding of functions) simply 
a class of ordered pairs of worlds and truth-values and has no finer structure. A function can often 
be defined in a number of different ways, in terms of definitions with different structures. It would 
be a sort of category mistake to ascribe the structure of any particular definition to the abstract 
function itself. In sum, it is very difficult to see any possible way to have a sentence intension 
which is both structured in the desired way and would still also be a sentence intension. 
 
Cresswell’s theorem. The above worries are reinforced by a certain rigorous result due to 
Cresswell (2002). Namely, Cresswell demonstrates that if a language only conforms to four 
reasonable conditions, the propositions expressed by sentences of that language which are true in 
exactly the same worlds are identical. It follows that if a language satisfies those conditions, 
propositions cannot really have any structure.17 The conditions of Cresswell’s result express 
credible general connections between sentences and the propositions they express, their truth-
conditions, the functional compositionality of meaning, and negation. Chalmers seems to be 
committed to the first three conditions, or it is at least quite natural to interpret him being so, and 
he does not seem to have any principled reason to deny the fourth condition on negation. Also for 
this reason, it is not clear that he can simultaneously appeal to structured propositions or structured 
intensions. Cresswell’s theorem should at least give Chalmers pause. 
 
 
13 More generally, whenever two sentences happen to be true in exactly the same worlds, they have the 
same intension, even if their meanings have intuitively very little in common.  
14 See, e.g., Chalmers 2002, p. 179; 2006a, pp. 595–96; 2010, p. 372; 2011b, p. 600; 2012, p. 42. 
15 Chalmers, though, refers to neither of them nor to anyone else here. See also King 2019. 
16 Cf. Chalmers 2010, pp. 558–59. 
17 In this and the next subsection (on Cresswell’s theorem and the Russell-Myhill paradox), I shall use the 
proposition talk uniformly with the relevant literature; however, these are clearly just as much challenges 
for the idea of structured intensions. 
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The Russell–Myhill Paradox. Then there is a paradox related to propositions, which goes back 
to Russell (1903) and Myhill (1958), the so-called Russell–Myhill Paradox. It has been neglected 
for a long time, but it has recently gained new interest.18 It can be viewed as a paradox specifically 
related to structured propositions. Unlike the better-known Kaplan’s paradox (which Chalmers 
(2011a) considers), this paradox does not require the assumption that the totality of propositions 
is a set – it may well be a proper class. However, generalizations concerning propositions are 
expressed repeatedly; consequently, it must be at least possible to quantify over propositions. 
Some relatively simple sentences attribute properties to entities. Propositions too have different 
properties. Some sentences attribute properties to propositions, and such a sentence presumably 
also expresses a proposition. Consequently, some propositions attribute a property to a 
proposition. But one can ask, in the case of any such proposition, whether it attributes the property 
to itself or not. The existence of the paradoxical property R then follows by comprehension. The 
assumption that propositions are structured directly entails that two propositions p1 and p2 of 
sentences attributing properties P and Q respectively to a proposition p3 (the propositions 
expressed by P(p3) and Q(p3)) or to all propositions (the propositions expressed by (∀p)P(p) and 
(∀p)Q(p)) can be identical only if P and Q are identical. With the above general assumptions and 
the assumption that propositions are structured, one ends up with a contradiction. 
Opinions seem to vary on just how unescapable and fatal the paradox is for structured 
propositions. There are known ways out of the paradox, such as Russell’s ramification of types, 
albeit at least that response is widely taken to be cumbersome and unattractive (Chalmers (2011a) 
himself expresses concerns about the ramification when he discusses Kaplan’s paradox). It is not 
clear whether any of these is both consistent with everything else that Chalmers assumes, well-
motivated and not ad hoc from that perspective, and genuinely available to him. Again, the burden 
is on Chalmers to present a convincing account of how exactly his semantic theory could avoid 
the contradiction. It is far from clear that Chalmers is entitled to give up any of the assumptions 
of the paradox if he wants to remain faithful to the Fregean tradition. 
 
Interim conclusion. The idea of structured propositions or structured intensions faces both 
serious technical troubles and more general philosophical challenges. 
 
3.2  The linguistic construction of scenarios 
As we have noted, Chalmers now often seems to prefer to construct the space of 1-worlds 
(scenarios) in a metaphysically neutral way from linguistic building blocks, that is, sentences. The 
intensions of singular terms are standardly functions from worlds to the referents of these 
expressions (in each world), that is, to certain individual entities (and the intensions of general 
terms are functions to sets of such entities). But if worlds are replaced by their linguistic 
descriptions, where does one get the values of these intensions: individual entities (and sets of 
them)? Chalmers’ solution is that individual entities are also constructed linguistically as 
equivalence classes of singular terms (equivalence modulo a priori entailment). 
This is an ingenious move, but it raises new critical questions when scrutinized more closely. 
To begin with, in what sense is this semantics anymore? A name is associated with a function 
from linguistic descriptions to linguistic expressions (or equivalence classes of such). The theory 
is thus confined to intra-linguistic relations and attaches only linguistic expressions to linguistic 
expressions (and classes of such); it provides no connection between the language and the extra-
linguistic reality. From a philosophical point of view, such “semantics” is somewhat vacuous. 
When Chalmers considers the straightforward and naive view that Fregean senses are simply 
descriptions, he notes critically that “senses of this sort can never break out of the linguistic 
 
18 See, e.g., Uzquiano 2015, Dorr 2016, Fritz 2017, Goodman 2017. I have also benefited from various 
unpublished notes on the paradox by Andrew Bacon, Sten Lindström, and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri. 
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domain” – and this is clearly a fault in his view (Chalmers 2002, p. 147). However, exactly the 
same is the case with his own 2D semantics with linguistically constructed scenarios.19 
Furthermore, the following question arises: Sentences and expressions of what kind of 
language are these building blocks of “worlds” intended to be? Clearly, it cannot be an 
uninterpreted formal language, but it must be an already interpreted and meaningful (idealized) 
language, for example, idealized English.20 Then again, it is one fundamental baseline of 
philosophical theorizing about meaning that two different expressions, including expressions 
from different languages, should be able to be synonymous – in other words, to share the same 
meaning or sense.21 For instance, according to the Fregean view, not only the expressions “The 
Morning Star” and “The Evening Star” have distinct meanings or senses, even though they 
actually refer to the same entity (the planet Venus). In addition, “The Morning Star,” “Der 
Morgenstern” (German), and “Aamutähti” (Finnish) all have the same sense or meaning. 
Understandably, Chalmers’ own discussion focuses on English. Accordingly, the intension of 
“The Morning Star,” in Chalmers’ view, is a function: more precisely, it is a set of ordered pairs 
in which the first entry is a scenario, that is (under the linguistic construction of scenarios), an 
equivalence class of maximal English sentences (complete descriptions of a possible world), and 
the second entry is a set of English expressions (an equivalence class of singular terms). However, 
let us then look instead, say, at Finnish. Obviously, its expressions must also have meanings or 
Fregean senses. But what are they? For example, what is the sense or the intension of the Finnish 
expression “Aamutähti”? In all reason, it must be the same as the sense or the intension of the 
corresponding English expression “the Morning Star,” as they intuitively mean the same. 
However, it would be quite odd if the meaning of a particular Finnish expression contained as its 
constituents expressions of English. 
Chalmers states: “A Fregean ‘thought’ [a sense of a sentence] is not a mental entity. It is 
more like what many philosophers call a proposition, capturing the content that a sentence 
expresses, when stripped of the accidental clothing of a particular language.” (Chalmers 2002, p. 
141) The linguistic construction of scenarios is, however, in apparent conflict with this. By the 
way, although Chalmers avoids committing himself without reservations to descriptivism, he 
sometimes proposes that the senses, or the intensions, can at least be approximated by so-called 
causal or metalinguistic descriptions (see, e.g., Chalmers 2002, p. 170). But this again violates 
the above point and ties a sense to a particular language.22  
 
3.3  Infinitary languages and their limits 
In all cases, complete canonical descriptions of scenarios play a central role in Chalmers’ 
approach. Chalmers notes repeatedly that his framework requires an idealized language which, 
among other things, allows infinite and even uncountable conjunctions (and perhaps disjunctions). 
He writes:  
 
19 Chalmers discussed this issue very briefly in Chalmers 2012, pp. 249–50. It is debatable whether those 
short remarks are sufficient to remove such worries.  
20 For example, when Chalmers discusses identifying expressions merely on the basis of their orthographic 
type (when they are made up of the same letters or sounds, regardless of their meaning), he notes that even 
“bachelors are unmarried” would then be false in some worlds, for instance, in worlds in which the string 
“bachelors are unmarried” means that horses are cows. And that would not obviously do for Chalmers. 
Consequently, the language must be already interpreted (Chalmers 2006b, p. 67).  
21 Frege himself explicitly held this view: “The same sense has different expressions in different languages” 
(Frege 1892a, p. 159). 
22 These descriptions, such as “The person called ‘Peter’ by those from whom I acquired the name,” 
explicitly involve expressions, such as “Peter,” of a particular language. (If we are talking about Saint Peter, 
he was called “Kepha” in Aramaic and “Petros” in Greek (both meaning “rock”); all these names 
presumably have the same sense in contrast to his original name “Simon,” with a distinct sense.) For more 
about the problems of such views, see Raatikainen 2020a. 
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There are reasons to believe that one should allow scenarios corresponding to arbitrarily 
large conjunctions. … So our ideal language should allow infinitary conjunctions with size 
corresponding to arbitrary cardinals, and some scenarios will require arbitrarily large 
conjunctions for their specification. (Chalmers 2011a, p. 90) 
Chalmers seems to assume that a sufficiently powerful infinitary language can always uniquely 
characterize at least the structure of any possible world – in technical terms, that a model can be 
characterized up to isomorphism. In reality, this is just not possible: although infinitary languages 
are very powerful indeed, and any countable structure can be fully described by a countable 
sentence, there are relatively simple models with the power 1 which cannot be described (up to 
isomorphism) even in the highly infinitary language £ (see Nadel & Stavi 1978). This means 
that there are possible worlds which differ in their structure but which are nevertheless inseparable 
in terms of even such an extremely strong infinitary language. It is not therefore clear that 
allowing infinite conjunctions in the language can deliver everything that Chalmers needs. 
 
 
4  Philosophical Worries 
4.1  The Status of Various Theses and the Golden Triangle 
After these technical critical questions, let us turn to more general philosophical issues. We 
observed above that Chalmers visibly takes the Core Thesis to be a substantive philosophical 
thesis and its establishment to be an important achievement. In particular, it would, according to 
him, restore “the golden triangle.” Chalmers also discussed various other philosophical theses, 
such as “the Carnapian Thesis,” and “the Neo-Fregean Thesis,” which according to him together 
constitute and support the golden triangle. 
For a start, let us simply assume that an exhaustive epistemic space of scenarios just  
has been somehow successfully delimited, in accordance with the basic intuitive understanding 
of a scenario as a maximally specific way the world might be, for all one can know a priori.23 Let 
us then note that, no matter how exactly “possible” and “necessary” are interpreted, the following 
two simple equivalences involving them hold more or less trivially: 
A is possible  iff  A is true in some possible world  
A is possible  iff  not-A is not necessary 
Let us call them “modal platitudes.” They have as immediate corollaries: 
A is necessary  iff  not-A is not possible 
A is necessary  iff  A is true in every possible world  
As is familiar, various modal logics are grounded on such platitudes.   
In Chalmers’ basic intuitive understanding of scenarios and their space, “possible” worlds of 
the 1st dimension (that is, scenarios) are taken to be all such worlds which are not ruled out a 
priori. In other words, it is simply stipulated that “possible” is here understood to mean being 
consistent with what is a priori knowable, that is, being not a priori refutable. However, in the 
light of “the modal platitudes,” that amounts to stipulating that “necessary” will henceforth be 
used, in the 1st dimension, to mean a priori knowable.24 
 
23 “Successfully” here is intended to mean in particular that the epistemic space is inclusive enough: if a 
sentence S is not a priori refutable, then there exists a scenario which makes S true. 
24 Echoing Evans, Chalmers himself on a few occasions calls this “deep epistemic necessity,” which should 
reveal that we are not talking about necessity in its standard metaphysical sense anymore. At least in one 
place, Chalmers even explicitly states: “We can say that s is deeply epistemically necessary when s is a 
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Recall then the Core Thesis: “S is a priori iff S has a necessary 1-intension.” As was noted 
above, the right-hand side is a bit of an opaque way of expressing things, but it evidently means 
that S is true in every scenario. We can now conclude that, if the epistemic 2D framework 
functions at all as it is intended to, in accordance with the basic intuitive understanding of the 
space of scenarios, the Core Thesis is, on closer scrutiny, more or less trivially true. Namely, if it 
is stipulated that “necessary” is from now on used (in this context) to mean a priori knowable – 
and this is what in effect happens in Chalmers’ 1st dimension – unsurprisingly there is a close 
connection between apriority and “necessity.” The Core Thesis is then virtually only a roundabout 
way of saying that what is a priori knowable is a priori knowable.25 And that is hardly a 
remarkable philosophical conclusion, and establishing it is hardly a significant philosophical 
achievement.  
Something very similar happens with the various other theses and the golden triangle. For 
simplicity, let us focus on sentences; “A ≡ B” thus means that “A” and “B” have the same truth-
value. The Carnapian Thesis then says that “A” and “B” have the same intension iff “A” and “B” 
have the same truth-value at every scenario. However, that holds trivially.26 The Neo-Fregean 
Thesis (2D version) becomes likewise, in a parallel way, nearly trivially true. Note, however, that 
“necessary” in the Carnapian Thesis, just like in the Core Thesis, is not any more the regular 
notion of necessity, but an epistemological surrogate. Consequently, Chalmers’ 2D framework 
does not as a matter of fact “restore the golden triangle,” that is, the (alleged) connections between 
necessity, apriority, and meaning, as was promised. Rather, it stipulatively redefines “necessary” 
to mean a priori knowable. 
It is important to see the wood for the trees here: if the golden triangle and the various related 
theses had really been fully restored, it would have been demonstrated that the Kripkean alleged 
a posteriori necessities are all in reality either contingent or a priori. However, nothing of the sort 
has been established. Elsewhere, Chalmers does not claim so much, but writes instead: “two-
dimensionalism proposes a unified analysis of the necessary a posteriori: all such sentences have 
a necessary secondary intension but a contingent primary intension” (Chalmers 2006a, p. 588; 
2010, p. 548). However, that amounts really to merely saying that necessary a posteriori truths 
are not a priori (this is what having a “contingent” 1-intension means in practice), which is trivial, 
given the definitional relation between a priori and a posteriori as opposites.27 And obviously, 
this does nothing to restore the golden triangle involving necessity proper. 
Chalmers does briefly address the question of triviality in a few places (Chalmers 2002, pp. 
151–52; 2006b, p. 105; 2010, p. 552). However, he focuses primarily on the connection between 
meaning (intension) and a priori. Chalmers grants that the strong connection between them is 
built into the framework to a large extent by definition. My main complaint of triviality, in 
contrast, concerns the stipulative redefinition of “necessary” to mean a priori knowability, which 
does nearly all the philosophical work here. It creates an illusion that a substantive connection 
with necessity (in its regular sense) has been established. In fact, the latter is simply set aside. 
The above-noted triviality of the various theses obviously disappears if the special 
metaphysical construction of scenarios as centered metaphysically possible worlds and the related 
thesis of Metaphysical Plenitude are additionally presupposed. Indeed, those theses then become 
quite controversial. But all the substantive content that results is due to Metaphysical Plenitude. 
 
priori” (Chalmers 2011a, p. 65). In some other contexts, Chalmers nevertheless seems to talk as if we were 
still dealing with necessity in its standard metaphysical sense.  
25 In one passage, Chalmers comes close to granting this: “On this [epistemic] construction, thesis (T5) [the 
Core Thesis] is all but guaranteed to be true” (Chalmers 2010, p. 552). On another occasion, he writes that 
under the metaphysical construction of scenarios specifically, the Core Thesis “is not entirely trivial” 
(Chalmers 2002, p. 152) and implicitly almost concedes that outside this specific construction, it is trivial. 
26 I am assuming here that only simple, standard sentence intensions are at issue. I shall discuss structured 
intensions after a while. 
27 For a primary intension to be “contingent” in the 1st dimension does not really mean that anything is 
contingent in the regular metaphysical sense, but only that its negation is made true by some scenarios, 
which means merely that it is not a priori. 
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Everything then turns to the question of whether the metaphysical construction can really succeed 
and satisfy the requirements of the epistemic 2D theory and the basic intuitive understanding of 
the space of scenarios – that is, whether it is inclusive enough. The 2D framework itself does 
otherwise no philosophical work here. 
A particular more specific attempt to construct the epistemic space of scenarios may of course 
be controversial, given the overall aims, and it may be nontrivial whether it can succeed. Some 
attempts may well fail. But either such a construction succeeds and fulfills the requirements of 
the basic intuitive understanding of the space of scenarios, or else it does not. If it does, the various 
philosophical theses of Chalmers become more or less trivial. If it does not, the whole 2D 
framework grounded upon it fails. Practically all the nontriviality there may be relates to the 
question of whether the particular construction can ever work in the intended way.  
If the golden triangle is ever to be fully restored, it will only be via the metaphysical 
construction and Metaphysical Plenitude. The more thoroughly epistemological construction of 
scenarios, which Chalmers now often seems to favor, simply cannot do so – it can only establish 
the rather trivial connection between a priori and “deep epistemic necessity” (which virtually just 
is a priori). 
Finally, even if Chalmers managed to firmly justify Metaphysical Plenitude, a Kripkean  
a posteriori necessary statement would still be necessary and a posteriori. Even if there existed a 
metaphysically possible world which would, when viewed differently,28 make true, for example, 
“Hesperus is not Phosphorus,” its opposite “Hesperus is Phosphorus” is no less necessary (in the 
customary sense of “necessary”) and no less a posteriori; necessity and apriority still diverge, and 
the golden triangle remains broken. As I said, it is important to see the wood for the trees here. 
Then again, assume that, following Chalmers’ reflected view, structured intensions are rather 
to be used (suppose they could somehow be made to work). Chalmers’ Carnapian and Neo-
Fregean theses then seemingly fail: even if “A” and “B” are a priori equivalent, but only have 
different syntactic structures, they will not have the same intension: Consider, for example, “Betty 
is a vixen” and “Betty is a fox and Betty is female.” Although allegedly equivalent a priori (at 
least by Chalmers’ own standards; see below), their structured intensions (whatever more exactly 
they are supposed to be) are by all reason different. Apparently, this also means that the restoration 
of the golden triangle fails.29  
 
4.2  Apriority, analyticity, synonymity, and meanings 
Intensions are functions and as such, they presuppose a domain. Therefore, before we can 
construct intensions, we must first specify their domain. It is a class of the relevant possible 
worlds. The possible worlds of the 1st dimension, scenarios, for Chalmers, are all worlds which 
are possible relative to the truths that are a priori knowable. But what, more exactly, is a priori 
knowable? This is in fact quite controversial in philosophy. Some noted philosophers such as 
Kitcher (1990, 2000) and Devitt (1998, 2005, 2010) contend that nothing is (and I am not entirely 
unsympathetic toward their critical arguments). Others may concede that logic and mathematics 
are, in some sense, a priori knowable, but nothing else is. Clearly Chalmers wants more, and for 
his 2D semantics to have any real interest, there has to be more.30 But what, and where does it 
come from? Chalmers’ few examples of a priori knowledge are somewhat disappointing. They 
are often only cases like: 
 
28 For example, if the actual world was such that “Hesperus” denoted in fact a satellite and not Venus (cf. 
Chalmers 2006b, p. 60). That would not change the widely accepted Kripkean conclusion, apparently 
granted also by Chalmers, that “Hesperus is Phosphorus” (with the meanings and references these names 
in reality have being fixed) is necessary (in the standard metaphysical sense). 
29 Recall that according to Chalmers, those philosophical theses together constitute and support the golden 
triangle. 
30 As will become more evident below, Chalmers’ 2D framework in fact requires abundant (non-logical) a 
priori connections between expressions.  
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All bachelors are unmarried males 
Lawyers are attorneys 
Chalmers also writes that “‘Vixens are rare’ and ‘Female foxes are rare’ are trivially equivalent” 
because they are “intuitively synonymous,” and consequently have the same Fregean sense. 
Chalmers contends that when two expressions are intuitively synonymous, an identity between 
them is trivial and knowable a priori (Chalmers 2002, p. 139).31   
The above are, of course, garden-variety examples of analytic truths, that is, of sentences 
which are true solely in virtue of the meanings of their words. Chalmers himself is talking about 
“intuitive synonymity” here. But where do these meanings and synonymities come from? We are 
only at the beginning of the undertaking of constructing intensions. As functions, intensions 
presuppose as their domain a class of worlds whose scope we have only begun to determine. 
Meaning facts and intuitive synonymities delimit it. Therefore, those meanings cannot be 
intensions, and the relevant synonymities cannot be based on intensions. These fundamental 
meanings must already be out there and presupposed. But this seems to contradict Chalmers’ 
explicitly stated precondition that we are not to presuppose any independently grounded Fregean 
meanings. 
There is a slogan in computer programming: “garbage in, garbage out.” Its idea is that there 
is only so much that a computer can do if the programming is bad or the inputted data is distorted 
or even blatantly false. Somewhat similarly, in the epistemic 2D framework, we only get out 
analytic truths we put in when we decide which worlds (scenarios) are “possible” (that is, are not 
refutable a priori). If we assume very little (or no) a priori knowledge of analytic truths, we get 
very little out. For example, one may want to rule out worlds in which bachelors are married, 
because that is (allegedly) false a priori, in virtue of the meanings of “bachelor” and “married.” 
It should not then be big news that the 1-intension of “No bachelor is married” is (epistemically) 
“necessary,” that is, true in all “possible” worlds, because one just ruled out worlds in which it 
would not be true as (epistemically) “impossible.” The intensions of “bachelor” and sentences 
containing it then simply reflect that choice. If it is, more controversially, assumed that 
“Hesperus” is analytically tied to, say, “the brightest object in the evening sky” and worlds which 
would contradict this are ruled out, one gets out intensions that mirror this choice. But if this 
assumption in not made, the resulting intensions in no way reflect the erased assumption. 
The fundamental meaning facts are therefore primary and given, the whole technical 
apparatus of scenarios and intensions merely mirrors them (probably less then perfectly), and it 
cannot in any way constitute them or explain them. The semi-formal 2D framework does virtually 
no real philosophical work here. We primarily get out only what we have put in. 
 
4.3  A priori entailment and scrutability  
So far, I have simply presupposed that sentences somehow intuitively have a truth-value in a 
world and expressions have or are associated with intensions, without asking: in virtue of what 
does a sentence have the truth-value and an expression have the intension it has? In common 
modal logics, the language is purely formal; there are numerous possible formal interpretation 
functions, or valuations, and it is simply assumed that one is chosen and fixed. However, in 
Chalmers’ 2D framework, the setting is quite different. Let us now take a closer look at this. 
Even if worlds (scenarios) were not constructed as linguistic from the beginning, instead of 
considering worlds in themselves, Chalmers quickly moves on to reflect “canonical” linguistic 
descriptions of worlds or scenarios (more of those descriptions below).32 Let D be such a 
canonical description of a world W. For a sentence S to be true in a world W then means, for 
 
31 This could be challenged: one might well have in one’s vocabulary, for example, both “groundhog” and 
“woodchuck” and use them fluently in conversation without recognizing that they actually apply to the 
same creature and are presumably intuitively synonymous. 
32 And if we follow the linguistic construction of worlds (scenarios), we are there already.  
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Chalmers, that there is an a priori entailment from D to S; that is, that the conditional “D → S” 
is knowable a priori. This also induces the intension of the sentence S: such a priori entailments 
determine in which worlds S is true and in which it is false.33 The general intuitive idea is the 
following: “once we know enough about the state of the world, we are in a position to know the 
truth-values of our sentences” (Chalmers 2006b, p. 90). The extensions and intensions of sub-
sentential expressions are (allegedly) achieved similarly: “Once we know how the world has 
turned out, once we know which epistemic possibility is actual, we are in a position to determine 
the extensions of our expressions” (Chalmers 2006b, p. 75). 
In order to avoid evident triviality, Chalmers requires that canonical descriptions of scenarios 
are given in a limited vocabulary, which does not include proper names and natural kind terms, 
for example:  
… one needs to make the case that epistemically complete descriptions do not need to 
specify the truth or falsity of most statements explicitly, so that epistemic evaluation does 
not have a trivial structure. (Chalmers 2006b, p. 89) 
Accordingly, Chalmers and Jackson (2001) have defended the following a priori entailment 
thesis: 
(AET) There is an a priori entailment from, roughly, physical and phenomenal truths to all other 
truths.  
More exactly, the limited base is restricted to (i) physical truths (P), that is, all truths of the 
languages of fundamental and classical physics; (ii) phenomenal truths (Q), which are truths about 
what it is like to be a given entity; (iii) (at least two) indexical truths (I) (e.g., “I am such-
and-such,” “Now is such-and-such”); and (iv) a totality or “that’s-all” truth (T) (which entails 
various negative truths, such as “there are no ghosts”). Chalmers abbreviates this base as PQTI 
(physical, qualia, that’s-all, indexical). Chalmers thus argues that all other truths, e.g., truths of 
the special sciences, possibly containing proper names and natural kind terms (not in the base 
language of PQTI) are a priori entailed by this very restricted base. Later Chalmers (2004, 2006b, 
2012) has expressed this conviction by saying that all truths are scrutable from the PQTI base. 
According to Chalmers, the scrutability framework aims to provide a foundation for his 2D 
semantics (Chalmers 2012, p. xxii). The PQTI base also assumedly determines a priori the 
extension of every expression (including those not in the language of PQTI) (see esp. Chalmers 
2012). And generalizing this, Chalmers contends that the canonical description D of an arbitrary 
world W in the restricted base language of PQTI entails a priori all sentences true in W. Chalmers 
comments on this as follows: 
A Priori Scrutability bears on this debate [Fregean vs Russellian accounts of meaning] in 
part by making the case that most expressions in natural language, … have substantive and 
nontrivial a priori connections to other expressions. In particular, they have substantive  
a priori connections to expressions in a compact base language (the language of PQTI, 
say). Substantive connections of this sort strongly suggest that there is a Fregean aspect of 
content that is reflected in these connections. (Chalmers 2012, p. 245; my emphasis) 
This is not the place to dwell on this overarching epistemological thesis – suffice it to say here 
that it is a very strong and quite controversial thesis and has been critically discussed considerably 
in the literature.34 But inasmuch as such comprehensive a priori entailments are dubious, primary 
intensions themselves threaten to become voluminously indeterminate. We may also note in 
passing that the various philosophical theses of Chalmers essentially depend on the sufficient 
 
33 This is the setting for the 1st dimension and 1-intensions. Chalmers does not say much about the 2nd 
dimension and how exactly sentences get their semantic values there, except that worlds are “considered as 
counterfactual.” (This is related to Chalmers’ distinction between world’s verifying a sentence and 
satisfying a sentence: cf. footnote 6.) 
34 See, e.g., Block & Stalnaker 1999, Byrne 1999, Díaz-León 2011, and Elpidorou 2014. (I discuss certain 
aspects of the thesis in some detail in Raatikainen 2020b; see also Raatikainen 2014.)  
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determinacy of intensions and become likewise contested in Chalmers’ specific a priori 
entailment approach to 1-intensions. 
Let us instead consider for a moment the alleged a priori entailment as such. Namely, we can 
ask on what is this a priori knowledge of the conditional “D → S” between a canonical description 
D of a world (scenario) and a sentence S itself grounded? Let us focus on the interesting case 
where S is neither a priori knowable in itself, nor in the neutral base language of canonical 
descriptions D of worlds; S may thus contain, e.g., proper names or natural kind terms. When the 
languages of D and S are distinct, the a priori entailment cannot in most cases be purely logical 
and formal. Therefore, even if we set aside (reasonable) doubts concerning such a priori 
entailments, it is clear that S must here first be equipped with a meaning, and only after that it is 
possible to evaluate whether a canonical description D in the base language a priori entails it or 
not. It is simply not possible to first decide such questions of (non-logical) a priori entailments 
and only afterwards construct the meaning for S on the ground of such a priori entailments. That 
would get things the wrong way round. The intension of S thus presupposes, in Chalmers’ setting, 
the meaning of S and depends essentially on it. The resulting intension can at best reflect this 
meaning, to some degree, but it cannot replace the real thing and do its job. But recall again that 
we were not, according to Chalmers, to presuppose any independent Fregean meanings. It now 
seems that Chalmers’ 2D approach cannot even get off the ground without violating this 
desideratum repeatedly.  
It is not always clear what rests on what in Chalmers’ writings. Namely, in Constructing the 
World (Chalmers 2012) and elsewhere, Chalmers grants that there are in general no definitions of 
the other expressions (e.g., proper names and natural kind terms) in terms of the base language of 
PQTI. However, he contends that the intensions of his 2D framework, which do not require 
explicit definitions, can take care of the job and support the a priori entailment (scrutability) thesis 
(see Chalmers 2012, pp. 16–19). But once again, it should be noted that we are only at the 
beginning of the undertaking of constructing a foundation for the 2D framework and 1-intensions 
in particular. Chalmers’ 1-intensions are not even well-defined without the pervasive a priori 
entailments being already on hand. As we have seen, Chalmers’ 2D semantics and its intensions 
presuppose the a priori entailment (scrutability) thesis and extensive a priori entailments. But 
now the plausibility of the a priori entailment (scrutability) thesis is made to depend on the 
availability of intensions. Sometimes it appears as if the justifications are moving in circles here. 
The philosophical thesis that linguistic expressions do have abundant and substantive  
a priori connections to other expressions, and to the restricted base language of PQTI in particular, 
is a very strong assumption, prima facie quite controversial, and acutely in need of philosophical 
support. Building a complex semi-formal system over this strong thesis, which takes the thesis 
for granted and merely mirrors its presuppositions, does not make the thesis itself more plausible. 
 
4.4  Semantic Pluralism as a Rescue? 
Expecting objections, Chalmers often retreats, as a preventive move, to a kind of semantic 
pluralism. He writes: 
… expressions can be associated with semantic values in many different ways…. there is 
no claim that any given semantic value exhausts the meaning of an expression … this 
approach gives little weight to disputes over whether a given (purported) semantic value is 
“the” meaning of an expression … Such disputes will be largely terminological, depending 
on the criteria one takes to be crucial in one’s prior notion of “meaning” or “semantics.” 
(Chalmers 2006b, p. 65) 
Instead, Chalmers frames as his key question the following: Is it possible to define intensions and 
associate sentences with intension so that the Core Thesis is true? However, we have seen above 
that it is very difficult to execute this in a way that is neither trivial nor infeasible. 
Be that as it may, I would argue that the philosophically interesting question is whether the 
entities we thus have at hand – Chalmers’ primary intensions, that is – have something to do with 
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meanings as they have been commonly understood in contemporary philosophy. After all, his 
expressed pluralism notwithstanding, Chalmers also repeatedly ties his theory and its intensions 
closely to the common notions of meaning and synonymity, and the mainstream philosophical 
debates about them. For example, he often puts his 2D semantics forward as a contribution to the 
debate between the Fregean and the Millian (or Russellian) theories of meaning. Chalmers says, 
for instance: “I have argued that a broadly Fregean account of meaning is tenable” (Chalmers 
2002, p. 178). To be sure, Chalmers never goes so far as to claim that his primary intension of an 
expression is “The Meaning.” Rather, he is content with saying that it is an aspect of meaning 
(albeit an important aspect).  
However, it is also a fact – and Chalmers on a few occasions explicitly grants it is – that 
Chalmers’ primary intensions just cannot be public meanings: he admits that his primary 
intensions “do not play the ‘public meaning’ role” (Chalmers 2012, p. 249).35 They are, on the 
contrary, fairly subjective and vary quite wildly even within one linguistic community. Chalmers 
contends that the issue is “largely terminological.” He adds:  
We could distinguish ‘type meanings’ and ‘token meanings’, and allow that primary 
intensions are not (in the general case) type meanings, but they are token meanings. Or we 
can use a different term, such as ‘content’, for the sort of meanings that can vary between 
tokens of an expression type. (Chalmers 2002, pp. 174–75) 
Perhaps that is what we should indeed do. The idea that meanings are intersubjectively shareable 
and public has been most predominant in the contemporary philosophy of language. No matter 
what was the real view of the historical Frege,36 if the aim is to participate in the later philosophical 
debates about meaning, from Carnap and Quine to Searle, Dummett, Putnam, and beyond, even 
the “Fregean” theories of meaning are primarily theories of meaning – where meaning is quite 
unanimously understood as something public, stable, and socially shared. If this widely held 
interpretation is given up, it is unclear whether one is participating in the same discussion 
anymore.37 So maybe it would indeed be clearer to reserve the term “meaning” for that notion, 
and use some other term for Chalmers’ notion, as he himself deliberates. 
Once we do that, however, it becomes visible that the issue is not purely terminological: 
Although there were several interesting aspects of meaning, it is not unreasonable to expect that 
even an aspect of meaning should still be an aspect of meaning – and not of something quite 
different. Furthermore, if the aim is to solve “Frege’s puzzles” about meaning, it does not help to 
offer a theory which is not even about meaning. For the theory may then be perfectly compatible 
with the Millian view about meaning. How could such an account ever convince a skeptic about 
Fregean meanings? Finally, how could epistemic two-dimensionalism ever hope to restore the 
golden triangle between reason, modality, and meaning if it does not even concern meaning? 
There is of course nothing wrong as such in an attempt to develop an account of some more 
subjective kind of content. But it should then be clear that such a theory has quite little relevance 
for the mainstream debates concerning meaning, where meaning – whatever else it is supposed 
 
35 See also Chalmers 2002, pp. 173–78. Chalmers comments: “On the account I have given, it is clear that 
the epistemic intension of a name can vary between speakers” (ibid., p. 173). 
36 In his defense, Chalmers refers here to Frege, and reminds that Frege allowed that two language-users 
may attach different senses to a name (Chalmers 2002, p. 175; 2012, p. 251). However, for Frege, such a 
difference of senses amounted to speaking really different languages. This aspect of Frege’s views on sense 
should not be one-sidedly exaggerated at the expense of just how central the objectivity and the shareability 
of meaning was for him (see, e.g., May 2006; Kremer 2010). Mankind has, according to Frege, “a common 
store” of meanings (“thoughts,” as he called the senses of sentences). Such a meaning can be expressed in 
different languages and is objective. The meaning (sense) of an expression or a sentence is what one grasps 
in understanding it: it is grasped by everyone sufficiently familiar with the language in which it belongs. 
Successful communication is grounded, for Frege, on shared meanings (Frege 1892a, b). In sum, arguably 
even Frege’s senses are much closer to public, shared, and stable linguistic (type) meanings than to 
Chalmers’ comparably subjective and varying 1-intensions. 
37 This issue is discussed a little more extensively in Raatikainen 2020a. 
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to be, and views vary – is standardly understood as something public and shared. It just seems as 
if Chalmers is trying to have his cake and eat it too here. Consequently, his view is quite unstable. 
 
4.5  Jubien’s Dilemma and Other Troubles 
Some of our philosophical concerns above may be related to the following: Chalmers’ 2D theory 
seems to be susceptible to what I like to call “Jubien’s dilemma” (for certain kinds of theories of 
propositions; see Jubien 2001; cf. King 2007). To begin with, among different types of theories 
of propositions, there are what Jubien calls mathematical theories. These are theories in which 
set-theoretical or other mathematical entities play the role of propositions. Jubien mentions 
explicitly theories in which propositions are functions from possible worlds to truth-values as a 
paradigm of such theories. Chalmers’ 2D theory thus clearly belongs to this category. Jubien next 
notes that the advocates of mathematical theories can take two rather different attitudes towards 
their theories: either such a theory is not even intended to be a theory of what propositions really 
are, but only to provide a model of propositions, where mathematical constructions are only 
“proposition surrogates,” or it is contended that the relevant mathematical constructions literally 
are propositions. 
The dilemma now is the following: in the former case, it is legitimate to press the fundamental 
question of what propositions themselves really are then. In the second case, in which the claim 
is that certain mathematical constructions (particular functions, or sets, for example) really are 
propositions – and it often seems as if this is the option toward which Chalmers is inclined – 
Jubien points out that such theories face a Benacerraf-type problem (more familiar from the 
philosophy of mathematics; see Benacerraf 1973).38 Namely, if it is possible to use certain kinds 
of set-theoretical constructions to play a role or represent a structure of theoretical interest, given 
the infinite richness and flexibility of the set-theoretical universe, it is typically possible to find 
indefinitely many other kinds of set-theoretical constructions which can do the same job just as 
well. 
Consider, for example, the suggestion that propositions are functions from possible worlds 
to truth-values. However, one could have also chosen to take propositions to be sets of possible 
worlds. And with a little ingenuity, one could no doubt provide any number of further (possibly 
more complex) set-theoretical candidates. But a plain set of possible worlds simply is not a 
function from possible worlds to truth-values – and similarly for other possible alternatives. There 
does not appear to exist any principled reason to consider any one particular candidate correct and 
all the others wrong. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that in reality, a proposition is not 
any of the alternative kinds of set theoretical constructions that can act as its surrogate. In sum, 
either a mathematical theory does not even begin to answer the question of what propositions 
truly are, and is as such seriously defective, or it does but is seriously undermined by a Benacerraf-
type problem.  
King (2007, pp. 7–8) extends the Benacerraf-like objection to mathematical theories of 
structured propositions. His own focus is, though, on Russellian structured propositions. But the 
critical argument clearly applies, mutatis mutandis, to Fregean structured propositions too. 
Consider thus, for example, the (alleged) structured Fregean proposition expressed by the 
sentence “Steve admires Ruth.” If ƒ1 is the intension of “admiring,” ƒ2 the intension of “Steve,” 
and ƒ3 that of “Ruth,” the alleged structured intension of the whole sentence might perhaps be the 
ordered triple: ⟨ ƒ1, ƒ2, ƒ3 ⟩. The enthusiasts of structured propositions may quickly identify the 
proposition expressed by the sentence with this particular triple (or with something analogous). 
But is this really plausible? In reality, one could find several different structured entities none of 
which seems less or more justifiable than others to be the proposition expressed by “Steve admires 
Ruth”: 
 
38 In fact, such a Benacerraf-type objection to mathematical theories of propositions was put forward 
already earlier by Crane 1992. 
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⟨ ƒ2, ƒ1, ƒ3⟩,  ⟨ ƒ2, ƒ3, ƒ1 ⟩,  ⟨ ƒ1, ⟨ ƒ2, ƒ3⟩⟩,   …     
There is also another fundamental problem for mathematical theories of propositions; it seems to 
be in the air already in Jubien (2001), but it is more explicitly (though still briefly) noted by King 
(2007). Namely, many things – sentences or statements, beliefs, etc. – can or at least appear to be 
able to represent the world, and therefore, be true or false, have truth-conditions, and so on. 
However, those who believe in propositions typically think that the former do so only 
derivatively, and that it is propositions which really and primarily have this property; that 
propositions represent the world and have truth-conditions essentially and non-derivatively. Quite 
independently of the details, propositions of mathematical theories are in any case simply some 
kinds of sets. However, sets do not normally essentially represent the external material world, that 
is, are not true or false and do not have truth-conditions – think of the set of integers, or the set of 
decreasing functions. So why would very few of them be an exception, and have essentially truth-
conditions – and if so, which ones and exactly in virtue of what (cf. King 2007, p. 8)? These are 
pressing philosophical questions for all mathematical theories of propositions.  
 
5  Conclusions 
We have taken note of various problematic aspects of Chalmers’ ambitious two-dimensionalist 
program. On the one hand, standard sentence intensions are far too coarse-grained to serve 
plausibly as anything like meanings. On the other hand, it turns out to be exceedingly unclear how 
more exactly one could really have coherently more fine-grained, structured intensions. The latter 
also face grave technical challenges. Constructing scenarios from linguistic constituents has 
certain philosophically odd consequences. Furthermore, it is not clear whether even allowing 
infinitary conjunctions is sufficient for all the purposes of Chalmers’ two-dimensionalism. 
As to my more general critical philosophical considerations, it is perhaps worth underlining 
that I have not argued here that there are no a priori knowable truths, or no analytic truths. 
Moreover, I have not defended the direct reference theory (or Millianism), or the Russellian view 
of propositions. Furthermore, I am emphatically not suggesting that the framework of possible 
worlds would be completely futile as a tool for analyzing semantic, epistemological, and 
metaphysical issues. My key question has rather been the following: Has Chalmers really 
succeeded, with the help of his epistemic 2D apparatus, to construct or ground Fregean meanings 
(at least a central aspect of such), to demonstrate that most expressions have wide and substantive 
a priori connections to other expressions, to convince even a skeptic about Fregean meanings that 
there are such things, and to restore the golden triangle of meaning, reason, and modality – as 
Chalmers explicitly stated as his aims? I have argued that all this remains doubtful, that on closer 
scrutiny, there are some serious gaps in the overall arguments, and the reasoning appears in some 
places somewhat circular. Chalmers barely provides the tools for breaking out of those circles. 
We have also identified several apparent stumbling blocks for Chalmers’ specific theory. It seems 
that in the attempt to restore the golden triangle of meaning, necessity, and apriority, both 
necessity and meaning are surreptitiously replaced with something else. 
Of course, no reasonable philosopher should deny that inasmuch as a word, or a concept, is 
analytically tied to some other expressions, or concepts, such as, perhaps, “bachelor” to 
“unmarried,” and those connections are knowable a priori, there is an aspect of its meaning that 
is “constitutively tied to the expression’s role in reason and cognition.” Such alleged connections, 
if they exist, are likely non-extensional and can undoubtedly be analyzed, to some extent, with 
the help of the framework of possible worlds. The argument is rather about the magnitude that 
there really are such a priori connections, and whether they are abundant enough to determine in 
general an expression’s extension and intension. Formal tools such as the 2D framework cannot 
even begin to answer the fundamental philosophical questions concerning the nature of meaning 
and the existence and scope of a priori knowledge and analytic a priori connections between 
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expressions. They merely mirror – less than completely, as the case may be – what is already out 
there, if indeed it even is out there. Chalmers apparently gives much too much philosophical work 
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